S1088 (“Managing changes to stations and shafts fire precautions”, Issue A3) is London Underground’s change-control process for the fire precautions at railway stations and at intervention and evacuation shafts where London Underground holds the Responsible Person duties under the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (S1088 Cl 2.1). It is also the route for Fire Authority exemptions under the Fire Precautions (Sub-surface Railway Stations) (England) Regulations 2009 (Cl 3.1.3). It is not a route for departing from a standard. Most delay on an S1088 comes from one cause: a submission that is incomplete or internally inconsistent, triggering a back-and-forth with the Fire Compliance Team (FCT). This is the running order that gets it right first time.
1. Is S1088 the right route?
- The premises is a station, or an intervention or evacuation shaft, where London Underground holds the Responsible Person duties (Cl 2.1). Other London Underground premises are outside its scope (Cl 2.3 g)), except that the standard can also be used for other London Underground premises (for example train crew accommodation or depots) where a fire risk assessment prepared under procedure PR0087 includes an action for a fire plan to be prepared (Cl 1.2). A retail unit or other premises is also outside its scope where it does not open into a station area, is separated by an imperforate wall, floor and ceiling of one hour fire resistance, and does not share escape routes with the station (Cl 2.3 h)). The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 and Building Regulations documentation duties still apply.
- The works are of a kind listed in Cl 2.2: works affecting the means of escape; short-term works such as escalator or lift refurbishment; a temporary or permanent change of use; a SID code change; works that materially alter the layout; storage of materials and equipment for the works; or isolation or temporary removal of a fire system during operational hours (including Night Tube). Check the Cl 2.3 exclusions.
- If the fire precautions, layout and use of areas are not changing, the works go through the Operational Assurance Notification process instead (Cl 3.2.2). The table at the start of form F1180 decides this.
- Surface or sub-surface status confirmed against the S1086 station table. It decides whether the Fire Precautions (Sub-surface Railway Stations) (England) Regulations 2009 apply and which approval route follows: at a surface station the FCT approves by signing F1180 (Cl 3.5.1); at a sub-surface station the FCT first notifies the Fire Authority under the Alteration Notices served on London Underground (Cl 3.5.2), and any exemption adds an application to the London Fire Brigade (Cl 3.6).
- Departures identified separately. A planned or known departure from a London Underground standard needs an S1641 concession; a deviation from the selected code of practice is based on BS 7974:2019 and described in the Fire Safety Strategy, and with TfL acceptance counts as a concession against S1080 only (S1080 Cl 3.3.2 and Note). S1088 records the change to the fire precautions; it does not approve the departure. Cross-reference any concession in the application.
- Change classified as temporary (bounded duration with a reinstatement plan) or permanent.
2. F1180 Part A: pre-application screen
Assess all ten fire-precaution categories; if any is affected, Parts B and C are required.
- Means of escape, including mobility-impaired and disabled persons (PRM provisions per BS 9992:2020)
- Firefighter access (RVP, LFB Plans Box, water supplies, station control point/room functionality)
- Firefighting equipment (fixed and portable)
- Fire detection and warning (any isolation, modification or temporary arrangement)
- Fire suppression (sprinkler, gas, deluge, water mist)
- Fire ventilation and pressurisation (smoke control, tunnel ventilation)
- Fire separation, compartmentation and structural fire protection
- Control of reaction-to-fire properties of materials (S1085 for any new materials)
- Fire safety signs
- Emergency lighting
3. F1180 Part B: the application
- Current version of the F1180 form used
- Applicant details complete (name, signature, position, company, contact) and project identification (project name, project manager, cost/booking reference)
- Station name; surface/sub-surface stated (per S1086)
- Station Area Identification Number(s) (SID) provided, as LCS Level 3 codes (per S1035)
- Current compliance fire plan number referenced (confirm the live revision)
- Design Proposal Plan: the works marked up on the existing compliance fire plan, showing the full extent of works
- Supporting documents listed and attached: fire strategy / fire strategy addendum, evacuation calculations, detailed design, risk assessments as applicable
- Description of works complete: location, size, construction methodology, active and passive system alterations, change of use, isolation requirements, whether the site is occupied, impact on LFB / customers / staff / tenants, contents per room/area
- Exemption field complete: Yes/No, temporary or permanent, and the specific regulation of the Fire Precautions (Sub-surface Railway Stations) (England) Regulations 2009 cited (see section 6)
- Risk assessment reference provided
- Date of application, and a specific date approval is required (not “ASAP”)
- Area Manager acceptance and signature, confirming the operational impact and the review of the WRA, CRA and Congestion Control and Emergency Plan (CCEP) (Cl 3.4.5)
4. WIFRA: Works Impact Fire Risk Assessment
- Description of works, estimated duration, and engineering-hours vs operational-hours working stated
- Fire load: hazardous materials (compressed gas, flammable liquids) and combustible material/waste introduction assessed
- Ignition sources: hot works, electric/diesel tools, works on electrical systems, arson risk assessed
- Impact on people: escape for the public and construction staff, evacuation times, signage, emergency lighting, station operators, other occupiers
- Evacuation calculations provided where the works adversely affect the means of escape (Cl 3.4.2)
- Cumulative effect of any concurrent works on the same station on means of escape assessed
- Fire safety systems altered or isolated identified, with additional documentation appended
- CCEP amendment requirement assessed (temporary or permanent), amended CCEP appended if applicable
- Control measures recorded; any S1641 concession the works rely on identified and cross-referenced (it is raised under S1641, not S1088)
- The application agreed and F1180 signed by an Accredited Fire Engineer (AFE) (Cl 3.4.4)
5. Technical basis for the change
- Fire-engineering assessment that is specific to the areas and systems affected, not generic
- Proposal checked against each Category 1 standard that applies by its own scope (for example S1080, S1081, S1082, S1085 and S1089)
- Any departure taken by its own route: an S1641 concession against a London Underground standard, or a deviation from the selected code of practice justified under BS 7974:2019 and described in the Fire Safety Strategy
- Demonstration that the change does not reduce the overall level of fire safety (ALARP applied)
- Fire strategy / addendum supporting the change referenced by document number and revision
- Compensatory measures wherever a precaution is reduced: specific, implementable, verifiable, and proportionate to the risk
- Quantitative analysis where appropriate: evacuation calculation (BS 9992:2020), smoke modelling, fire-resistance/fire-load calculations
6. Exemptions under the Fire Precautions (Sub-surface Railway Stations) (England) Regulations 2009
- Whether an exemption is required confirmed. Exemptions are available only against Regulations 5(2), 6(2), 9(8) and 10(2), and are granted by the Fire Authority by notice under Regulation 11
- The specific regulation cited: Reg 5(2) an automatically activated means for fighting fire in the parts listed in Reg 5(1) (generator, transformer and switchgear rooms other than those housing escalator, passenger conveyor or lift machinery; storage areas, including refuse stores; and shops); Reg 6(2) automatic fire detection; Reg 9(8) keeping staff instruction and fire drill records on the premises; Reg 10(2) at least two staff on duty while the public has access
- The request made by the right person: the accredited fire safety engineer for Regs 5(2) and 6(2), the Area Manager for temporary exemptions from Regs 9(8) and 10(2) (S1089 Cl 5.2, 5.3)
- The FCT applies to the London Fire Brigade for the exemption, using the applicant’s evidence, with the project AFE assisting (S1088 Cl 3.2.4, 3.6.2)
- Temporary vs open (permanent) classification stated; temporary exemptions carry an end date agreed with the London Fire Brigade (Cl 3.6.4)
- Evidence that the exemption is valid, with additional mitigation where a temporary reduction in precautions is proposed (Cl 3.6.1)
- No works started until the exemption is received and F1180 updated (Cl 3.6.3)
7. Supporting design and assurance documents
- Compartmentation plans marked up, before and after clearly distinguished
- Fire plans of the affected area (detection, suppression coverage, fire mains, compartmentation/separation requirements)
- Fire door schedule updated where door ratings/locations/ironmongery change
- Firestopping details where compartmentation is affected, with tested system references (BS EN 1366-3:2021 / BS EN 13501-2:2023)
- Materials data sheets and reaction-to-fire classification for new materials assessed under S1085; any departure from S1085 taken through an S1641 concession
- Cause and Effects matrix updated where system logic is affected
- Fire Approval Plans: the change shown in a clouded area on the relevant station fire plan layout(s) (Cl 3.5.4)
8. Approval, completion and Authority to Use
- Application submitted to the FCT with all supporting evidence. The FCT is the single point of contact with the Fire Authority (the London Fire Brigade) for change applications (Cl 3.1.7); do not approach the Fire Authority directly
- Design consultation with the London Fire Brigade on fire engineering design and fire strategy goes through the TfL Principal Fire Engineer or a nominated accredited representative (Cl 3.1.8). S1088 carries no general London Fire Brigade sign-off of the design
- No works started on the premises before FCT approval and the issue of the Approval Plan (Cl 3.5.1, 3.5.2)
- Start of works notified to the FCT, so the fire plans can be clouded and marked “Under Construction” (Cl 3.5.3, 3.8.1)
- On completion, AFE sign-off of the changes on F1180, with the compliance inspection reports that apply (F1452 to F1456) (Cl 3.8.2, 3.8.3)
- Authority to Use (F1180 Part C) is a hard gate: no modified area brought into operational use until the FCT has granted ATU (Cl 3.2.3, 3.8.4, 4.4.3)
- Close-out evidence filed; the FCT updates and reissues the fire plans (Cl 3.8.5)
Common pitfalls we see
- Surface/sub-surface flag wrong, so the wrong regulatory set is applied.
- An S1088 application treated as approval of a departure from a standard; the S1641 concession or the BS 7974:2019 justification is missing.
- Stale template residue (a previous station’s name or SIDs left in the WIFRA or headers).
- Form fields claiming evidence the narrative does not contain.
- Temporary-works submissions duplicated instead of cross-referenced.
- “Refuge” used loosely; be clear whether it means a fire-evacuation refuge or a construction/platform working width.
- Standard editions and form revisions unverified.
- Affected Station Area Identification Numbers (SIDs) not fully accounted for.
- Existing fire-compartmentation lines altered without a clear understanding of their extent and function.
- Insufficient lead time allowed for the application to be processed, particularly at sub-surface stations, where Fire Authority notification and any exemption application extend the timeline.
- Changes to fire precautions, and the concessions and exemptions they depend on, identified only once detailed design is largely complete, so they surface at FCT review and force costly redesign. Build the S1088 register at concept stage.
- Temporary-works submissions that do not show escape-route constraints (hoarding lines, door-swing directions) at an adequate scale; enlarge the critical pinch points.
- Event-driven peak loading (for example match-day at a venue station) not taken as the worst-case scenario.
- Combustible packaging and waste brought onto an operational station during works left unmanaged; include a fire-load management and daily-removal statement.
General guidance for industry-literate readers, not a substitute for project-specific fire-engineering advice or the current TfL standard and F1180 form. Verify the live S1088 / S1089 standard text and the current form before relying on this.